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1. Introduction 
Five years after the Jasmine revolution of January 2011, the Tunisian economy is still struggling 
to recover despite the successful, albeit rocky, transition to a democratic regime crowned by the 
adoption of a new constitution in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). Economists and international 
organizations,1 have found that political instability, which increased considerably after the Arab 
Spring as evident by the 18-fold surge in the number of protests/riots in 2011-2014 compared 
to 1997-2010, adversely affected the macroeconomic environment in Tunisia. However, to date 
and to our knowledge, the microeconomic implications of political instability on Tunisian firms 
remain unexplored. 
 
 In this context, this paper explores which Tunisian firms perceived political instability as an 
impediment to their operations and examines which business constraint was the most damaging 
to firm growth after the revolution. To do so, we use firm-level data from the Tunisian Enterprise 
Survey (TES) conducted between March 2013 and July 2014. Unlike other surveys, this database 
contains a firm-level measure of political instability defined as the manager’s response to how 
much he/she considers political instability as a constraint to the firm’s operations. In addition, 
the TES includes a lot of information on firm characteristics which enables us to control for 
different factors and thus minimize any possible omitted variable bias. Nonetheless, we fully 
acknowledge the limitations of the cross-sectional nature of our data and the use of a subjective 
measure of political instability. These empirical challenges, which are often encountered by 
researchers when using micro-level surveys to investigated the effects of political instability 
(Brück et al., 2016), call for designing systematic surveys that would provide valuable micro-data 
on political incidents across place and time. 
 
 This paper is mainly related to the literature that examined the determinants and effects of 
business constraints on firm performance.2 Batra et al. (2003) were the first to assess the relation 
between business constraints and firm growth. Using data from 80 countries, they found that 
firm performance is negatively related to: financing constraints, corruption, higher taxes, 
inefficient business regulations, and policy uncertainty. Following this work, and given that 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBESs) were later made available to the public,61 researchers 
have extensively used these surveys to better understand the relation between business obstacles 
and firm performance. For instance, Beck et al. (2005) found that legal, financing and corruption 
constraints adversely impact firm growth which they measured as the growth of sales during the 
past three years. In related studies, Aterido et al. (2011) found that inefficient business 
regulations and lack of finance reduce the growth of full-time employees, while Ayyagari et al. 
(2008) found that finance, crime and policy uncertainty are the most damaging business 
constraints to firms across countries. 
 
                                                          
1 Matta et al. (2016), Arieff and Humud (2015), IMF (2015) and World Bank (2015); among others.  
2 An extensive review of the literature that examined the impact of business constraints on firm performance 
can be found in World Bank (2004) and Dethier et al. (2011). 
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 Although these studies have examined the effects of various business constraints on firm 
performance, political instability has not caught the attention of researchers so far, mainly 
because it was not explicitly mentioned as an obstacle in earlier surveys. Thus, this paper fills 
this gap by analyzing, for the first time, which firms perceive political instability as a significant 
obstacle to their operations. Moreover, most of the earlier studies in the literature have focused 
on cross-country regressions which suffer from two main caveats. First, they ignore 
heterogeneity among countries with distinct legal, regulatory and financial systems. Second, 
their estimation results might be driven by trends in big countries such as India and China 
(Krauss, 2015). Therefore, this study also adds to the literature by examining the previously 
unexplored implications of business constraints on firm growth in a context of mass civil protests 
and post-revolutions. 
 
 Our results suggest that political instability was a major concern for small and exporting firms 
as well as those that were operating in the tourism sector, those that suffered from acts of 
vandalism or arson and those that were in the interior region of Tunisia. More importantly, we 
find strong evidence that political instability was the most damaging constraint to firm growth 
in Tunisia after the Arab Spring. This result, which is confirmed using an instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation strategy with region-sector-size averages as benchmark instruments, is robust 
after (i) using employment growth as an alternative measure of firm performance and (ii) 
accounting for various business constraint levels. 
 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and describes the 
data, while section 3 explores which firms perceive political instability as a significant obstacle 
to their operations. This is followed by section 4 which determines the most damaging constraint 
to firm growth and performs some robustness checks. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section introduces the dataset and analyzes descriptively the business environment 
constraints to Tunisian firms. In this study, we use the 2013 Tunisian Enterprise Survey (TES) 
which was conducted jointly by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB).3 The sampling unit of analysis 
is the “Establishment” which we denote interchangeably in what follows as “Firm” or 
“Enterprise”. 
 
 The TES dataset, which was collected through personal interviews with 592 Tunisian firm 
managers/owners between March 2013 and July 2014,4 includes enterprises located in the 
                                                          
3 These surveys are freely available for researchers and policymakers who can register online and access the 
raw data using the following link: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/survey-datasets. As of August 
2015, enterprise surveys have been conducted by the World Bank and its partners in 135 countries around the 
world. 
4 The Arab Spring which started in December 2010 was followed by several political incidents in the 
subsequent years. In fact, political instability peaked in 2012 (see Figure 2 below) when the disagreement 
between the secular opposition and the Islamic-led government intensified. Thus, it is plausible to assume that 
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following regions: Tunis (the capital), Sfax, Northeast, South Coast/West and Interior. It also 
covers firms that operate in the retail (10.6 percent), services (33.5 percent) and manufacturing 
(55.9 percent) sectors,5 as well as small (36 percent), medium (41 percent) and large (23 percent) 
firms employing 5 to 19, 20 to 99, and more than 100 employees, respectively. 
 
 Moreover, the TES records several firm characteristics such as the size of a firm, its age and 
export activity, whether the firm is foreign owned, the manager’s years of experience, his/her 
gender and education level and finally whether a firm received any subsidies from national or 
international institutions. Table A.16 in the Appendix lists the definitions and different categories 
corresponding to each firm characteristic. Another nice feature of the TES is that managers have 
reported (retrospectively) the actual sales figures of their corresponding companies for the years 
2009 and 2012. This data allows us to measure firm performance as the real sales growth rate 
between 2009 and 2012. Given that the sales figures are reported in nominal terms, we deflate 
them using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as published in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicator (WDI) database.7 In addition, we trim the first and last two percentiles 
of the data in order to avoid outliers.8 As a result, our sample is slightly reduced from 592 
observations to 569. Table A.2 presents summary statistics of the above firm characteristics.  
 
 Most interestingly, the TES questionnaire asks firm managers to what extent the 17 possible 
business environment obstacles, presented in Table A.3, have an impact on the operations of 
firms. The main question used in the survey to gauge the perception of a firm manager towards 
a certain constraint is: “To what degree is constraint X an obstacle to the current operations of 
this establishment?” The answers to that question include a five-point scale ranging from “No 
Obstacle” coded as 0, “Minor Obstacle coded as 1, “Moderate Obstacle” coded as 2, “Major 
                                                          
firm managers would have had a better sentiment about the political situation in Tunisia when the TES data 
was collected (between March 2013 and July 2014) as the political instability decreased compared to 2012. If 
this assumption holds, then our results about the adverse effect about political instability on firm performance 
would likely be underestimated.  
5  Note that firms operating in the financial intermediation, renting, public and real estate sectors are not part 
of the TES. 
6 All tables and figures that start with an “A” are in the Appendix. 
7 Ideally, we would have deflated nominal sales using the Producer Price Index (PPI) as we are focusing on 
firms. Unfortunately, the Tunisian Institute of Statistics publishes monthly data regarding the Price Index of 
Industrial Sales (PIIS) starting from January 2014 only, which means we do not have data that covers our 
period of interest (2009-2012). However, the correlation between the yearly growth of CPI and that of the PIIS 
was 0.89 between January 2015 and December 2016, suggesting that using the PIIS instead of the CPI does 
not have a significant impact on our results. Moreover, both the CPI and the GDP deflator increased by 13.7 
percent between 2009 and 2012; hence supporting our assumption that the CPI is a good variable to deflate 
the nominal sales figures.  
8 The original dataset included firms that had a real sales growth between 2009 and 2012 of more than 500 
percent. These observations pushed the distribution to be extremely right skewed. Using the Shapiro–Wilk 
test we could reject the null hypothesis that the sales growth variable was normally distributed as the z statistic 
was 12.7. When we trimmed the first and last two percentiles of our data, the Shapiro–Wilk test still rejected 
the normality assumption, however with a much lower z statistic of 7.4 implying that variable sales growth is 
much closer to the normal distribution than before.  
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Obstacle” coded as 3, and “Very Severe Obstacle” coded as 4.9 Figure A.1 illustrates the frequency 
distribution corresponding to each constraint. 
 
 Figure 1 (below) presents the proportion of surveyed firms that considered each constraint as 
a major or very severe problem to their functioning. Political instability clearly stands out as the 
most worrying obstacle, with 55.2 percent of firms considering it as a major or very severe 
obstacle to their operations. This large percentage is not surprising given the surge in political 
instability events since the onset of the Tunisian revolution. In fact, the increase in political 
incidents is evident from Figure 2 which plots the actual number of conflict events that happened 
in Tunisia over time using data drawn from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(ACLED); a separate database than the TES.10 For instance, the total number of protests/riots 
that took place during the period 2011-2014 increased by more than 18-fold compared to the 
period spanning from 1997 till 2010 (green line in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of firms considering the 
corresponding issue as a major or severe constraint 
 
Source: TES and author’s own calculations. 
Figure 2: Actual number of political instability 
events in Tunisia over time 
 
Source: ACLED database and author’s own calculations. 
 
 Moreover, the results reported in Table A.3 cements our observation that Tunisian firms 
consider political instability to be the most severe obstacle to their day-to-day operations. Indeed, 
among the 17 obstacles, political instability had the highest average response of 2.4 (column 1). 
Even across different firm characteristics (size, exporting status, region, etc.), political instability 
was, by far, the most worrying constraint to Tunisian firms. This largely contrasts with obstacles 
such as access to land, business licensing and permits, courts, crime theft and disorder, customs 
and trade regulations, labor regulations, electricity, telecommunications and transport that had 
                                                          
9 Two other possible answers to this question were “Don’t know” and “Does not apply” coded respectively as -
9 and -7. Given that these answers may distort our results, we recoded these observations as missing.  
10 A brief description of the ACLED database (Raleigh and Dowd, 2015; Raleigh et al., 2010) as well a definition 
for each conflict event reported in Figure 2 can be found in section SA.1 of the supplemental appendix which 
is attached to the published version of this paper. 
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an average response below 1, suggesting that firms did not perceive these issues as significantly 
disturbing to their functioning. 
 
 One possible drawback of our analysis is the use of subjective data as measures of firm 
constraints. According to Bertrand and Mullatinathan (2001), subjective measures used typically 
in surveys may be affected by general waves of optimism or pessimism which may induce a 
measurement error. In section SA.2 in the supplemental appendix of this paper, we show that the 
subjective measures used here are significantly correlated with their objective counterparts, 
hence overcoming this issue. 
 
 Notwithstanding this finding, we argue that the political instability constraint, which we are 
mostly interested in, and which does not have any objective counterpart in the TES, suffers from 
a measurement error. In particular, De Haan (2007) argued that political instability indicators 
tend to be measured with errors, because researchers usually focus on one dimension only (e.g. 
political violence, armed conflicts, civil protests, instability of the political regime, etc.), while in 
reality the concept of political turmoil is multidimensional as argued in the political science 
literature (Hibbs, 1973; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Rummel, 1963; Tanter, 1966). Consequently, when 
the political instability measure is used as a right-hand side variable in a regression, the OLS 
coefficient is likely to be biased downwards (Hausman, 2001). 
 
 In addition, it is noteworthy to mention that the TES might suffer from a sample selection 
problem if firm exit because of the 2011 revolution was not random. While it is not possible to 
directly address this potential survivor bias given that the TES does not cover the pre-revolution 
period, we find no (observable) evidence, as detailed in section SA.3 in the supplemental appendix, 
in support of this bias. 
3. Determinants of the Political Instability Constraint  
In this section, we explore which Tunisian firms perceived political instability as a bigger 
obstacle to their operations after the Arab Spring uprisings. We use an ordered probit model 
since the dependent variable is a five-point ordinal variable that measures how firm managers 
perceive political instability.  
 
 To identify relevant explanatory variables, we present theoretical arguments on why certain 
firms might perceive political instability as a larger constraint than others. First, exporting firms 
might be more impacted by political instability as they become, during periods of political 
turmoil, less competitive vis-à-vis other international competitors due to higher costs of 
production and a degeneration of human capital skills (Collier and Duponchel, 2013). Second, 
small companies tend to perceive political instability as a bigger impediment to their operations, 
relative to large firms, because they have fewer resources to survive during periods of turmoil. 
In addition, small firms do not have a bargaining power as large firms in order to influence policy 
makers and obtain preferential treatments. For instance, during recessions, large enterprises 
“might threaten to lay off workers if they do not get tax reductions” (Schiffer and Weder, 2001, 
p. 4). Third, political instability would be a lesser constraint to firms with experienced managers 
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as such firms can find efficient solutions during periods of turmoil given that they already dealt 
with similar crisis in the past. As stated by Sayegh et al. (2004, p. 186) “a manager with past 
experience with events similar to the current crisis may have assumptions about the cause of the 
crisis through matching the current situation with his/her existing narrative schema, and thus 
might be able to make more effective decisions based on these assumptions”. Fourth, firms in 
different sectors might perceive political instability as an obstacle differently. In particular, 
enterprises operating in the tourism sector are more vulnerable to higher levels of political 
instability as international tourism is a luxurious activity with a high income elasticity of demand 
(Lim, 1997).11 For instance, tourists cancel, postpone or substitute their travel plans to more 
secure countries in the wake of political turmoil (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998). Fifth, higher levels 
of education allow individuals to cope more efficiently with sudden changes in the economic 
environment. For instance, Schultz (1975) argued that more educated farmers were more 
successful during periods of disequilibria and changing economic environments. Sixth, during 
periods of unrest, acts of vandalism and arson tend to increase and consequently firm productivity 
drops because these events are usually coupled with road blockades and damage to the 
infrastructure. Kamal and Kaiser (2015) showed that the Bengali readymade garment (RMG) 
sector was adversely impacted by acts of arson and vandalism that happened on the eve of the 
parliamentary elections in 2013. 
 
 To minimize any potential omitted variable bias, we add the following firm-level 
characteristics based on the existing literature that explored which firms tend to be more 
constrained by business obstacles:12 firm age, foreign company (a dummy variable equals 1 if 
foreign individuals or companies hold at least 50 percent of the firm and 0 otherwise), manager’s 
gender and subsidy (a dummy variable equals 1 if this establishment received any subsidies from 
the national international institutions and 0 otherwise).13 Overall, we estimate the following 
ordered probit regression:   
 
 𝑃𝑜𝑙 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3. 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4. 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽5. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛽6. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽8. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽9. 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖
+ 𝜸′[𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓] + 𝜀𝑖  . 
(1) 
   
 In equation (1), the dependent variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖, which ranges between 0 and 4, is higher 
the more firm 𝑖 considers political instability as a constraint to its operations, while 𝜀𝑖 is a vector 
of independent and identically distributed error terms. To account for heteroscedasticity, we use 
                                                          
11 The impact of terrorism, one of the facets of political instability, on tourism has been documented extensively 
in the literature (Drakos and Kutan, 2003; Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Neumayer, 2004).  
12 Kounouwewa and Chao (2011) and Vargas (2015) examined the determinants of financial obstacles, while 
Beck et al. (2005) examined the firm characteristics that can explain variation in the legal and corruption 
constraints to firms. Moreover, Carlin et al. (2006) explored the firm determinants of financing and customs 
regulation obstacles. 
13 As argued by Beck et al. (2005), the subsidy dummy can be used to capture the different market structures 
in which firms might operate.  
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robust standard errors. Moreover, 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 is a vector of dummy variables that includes sector 
specific (food, other manufacturing, retail and services) fixed-effects.14  
 
 We are interested in the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients on each of the 
explanatory variables. A positive (negative) and significant coefficient means that firms with that 
given attribute consider political instability as a higher (lower) obstacle to their growth than 
firms that do not have this attribute. The estimation results of equation (1), displayed in 
specification 1 of Table 1, indicate, as suggested by the theoretical arguments, that firm size, 
manager’s experience, exporting and touristic firms as well as firms that suffered from acts of 
vandalism and arson are all good predictors of the political instability constraint. We also find 
that firms operating in the food industry have a significantly negative coefficient, indicating that 
they are less concerned by political instability. 
  
                                                          
14 The garment sector is the omitted category. 
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Table 1: Ordered Probit model of Political Instability regressed on firm characteristics 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. The dependent variable is the political instability constraint which 
takes five values ranging from 0 to 4. The omitted categories are medium firms and the 
garment sector. Losses due to crime (% of sales) denote the estimated losses as a result of theft, 
robbery, vandalism or arson that occurred on the firm’s premises as a percentage of total 
annual sales in 2012. Columns 2 and 4 represent the average marginal effects (AME) on the 
probability that firms considering political instability as a major constraint to their operations. 
 
Coefficient   AME(4)   Coefficient   AME(4)   
Small 0.227** 0.066** 0.236** 0.068** 
(0.111)   (0.033)   (0.111)   (0.033)   
Large -0.161   -0.040   -0.175   -0.043   
(0.121)   (0.030)   (0.122)   (0.029)   
Age -0.001   -0.000   -0.000   -0.000   
(0.003)   (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.001)   
Exporter 0.237** 0.065** 0.245** 0.067** 
(0.109)   (0.030)   (0.110)   (0.030)   
Foreign -0.193   -0.053   -0.190   -0.052   
(0.190)   (0.052)   (0.192)   (0.052)   
Manag Exp -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.011** -0.003** 
(0.005)   (0.001)   (0.005)   (0.001)   
Manag Gend -0.060   -0.017   -0.074   -0.020   
(0.200)   (0.055)   (0.205)   (0.056)   
Manag Educ 0.063   0.017   0.059   0.016   
(0.089)   (0.024)   (0.090)   (0.025)   
Subsidy 0.008   0.002   -0.014   -0.004   
(0.135)   (0.037)   (0.136)   (0.037)   
Food -0.312** -0.086** -0.326** -0.089** 
(0.158)   (0.044)   (0.160)   (0.044)   
Other Manuf -0.155   -0.043   -0.208   -0.057   
(0.162)   (0.044)   (0.162)   (0.044)   
Retail -0.073   -0.020   -0.081   -0.022   
(0.159)   (0.044)   (0.165)   (0.045)   
Other Serv 0.077   0.021   0.066   0.018   
(0.157)   (0.043)   (0.160)   (0.044)   
Tourism 0.521** 0.144** 0.447*  0.122*  
(0.264)   (0.072)   (0.262)   (0.071)   
Losses due to crime (% of sales) 0.132*** 0.036*** 0.131*** 0.036***
(0.050)   (0.014)   (0.045)   (0.012)   
Tunis                 -0.119   -0.032   
                (0.135)   (0.036)   
Sfax                 -0.103   -0.028   
                (0.144)   (0.038)   
South Coast/West                 -0.047   -0.013   
                (0.131)   (0.036)   
Interior                 0.430** 0.138** 
                (0.192)   (0.065)   
Observations   555     555     555     555   
Specification 1   Specification 2   
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 Given that the standard coefficients generated from the ordered probit model are not easily 
interpretable from an economic perspective, we estimate the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) 
of firms considering political instability as a very severe constraint to their operations.15 The 
results reported in column 2 of Table 1, suggest that exporting firms and those that operate in 
the tourism sector are, on average, 6.5 and 14.4 percent more likely to perceive political 
instability as a very severe obstacle to their growth, respectively.16 In contrast, firms in the food 
industry sector are 8.6 percent less likely to perceive political instability as a very severe obstacle. 
The first two columns of Table 1 also indicate that the perception of firms toward political 
instability relates negatively to firm size, with smaller (larger) firms reporting it as a higher 
(lower) constraint.17 This relation is, however, only significant for small firms which face a 6.6 
percent higher probability of perceiving political instability as a very severe obstacle.18 
Furthermore, a 1 percentage point increase in losses resulting from crime actions (vandalism, 
arson, etc.) is associated with a 3.6 percent higher likelihood of considering political instability 
as a very severe obstacle. The results also show that firms managers who have 10 more years of 
work experience are, on average, 3 percent less likely to perceive political instability as a very 
severe constraint. Meanwhile, the gender of a manager, his/her education level, as well as the 
age of the firm and whether it receives a subsidy or is owned by foreigners are not statistically 
significant do not explain how firms perceive political instability. 
 
 As argued by Collier and Duponchel (2013), firms operating in regions of high conflict 
intensity are the most affected by a conflict. To examine whether firms are concerned about 
political instability across different regions, we introduce regional dummies to equation (1). 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 present, respectively, the estimation results and corresponding 
AMEs of that model which we denote by specification 2. While the sign and statistical 
significance of earlier results are unchanged, only the coefficient on the dummy variable 
corresponding to the interior region is significantly correlated with how firms perceive political 
instability. In terms of magnitude, firms in the interior region are, on average, 13.8 percent more 
likely to perceive political instability as a very severe obstacle to their growth. This large 
association is not surprising given that the interior region, which was economically and socially 
                                                          
15 The average marginal effects coefficients can be interpreted as the probability of a firm reporting a 4 (very 
severe) on political instability for a one unit increase in the corresponding explanatory variable. 
16 It might also be the case that exporting firms were negatively affected by the economic conditions in the 
destination market. In particular, Libya, which accounted for 4.5 percent of Tunisian exports in 2010, 
experienced a major economic downturn following the conflict that started in 2011 and toppled Muammar 
Gaddafi. As a result, Tunisian firms that used to export Libya would have been adversely affected by the Libyan 
conflict. Unfortunately, we cannot capture this possible channel using the TES because it does not record the 
export destination of each firm. 
17 The medium size firms are the omitted category. 
18 There are two potential explanations why small firms might perceive political instability as a bigger 
constraint. One possibility is that small companies are impacted by a different treatment in the sense that they 
might be closer in distance to riots and violent incidents. Unfortunately, the TES dataset does not reveal the 
geocoded data corresponding to each firm, preventing us from testing this hypothesis. Another possibility, 
which we presented above, is that during prolonged periods of political instability, small companies have fewer 
financial resources to survive. Further research, based on more disaggregated data, is required to distinguish 
between these propositions. 
10 
 
marginalized relative to the coastal areas, experienced the highest number of political instability 
events since the revolution erupted early 2011 as presented in Figure A.2 which illustrates the 
spatial distribution of the number political incidents in Tunisia between 2011 and 2014.19 In 
particular, the interior region includes two cities that were at the heart of the Jasmine revolution: 
Sidi Bouzid which was the birthplace of the Tunisian revolution from which protests against Ben 
Ali’s regime commenced after Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in its streets on 17 December 
2010; and Gafsa city, the mining capital of Tunisia, which was hit severely in the aftermath of 
the revolution as protests, by poor citizens demanding jobs and higher living standards, 
paralyzed the mining industry which accounted for 9.2 percent of total exported goods in 2010.20 
Moreover, this result is consistent with the literature on the determinants of political unrest, 
which finds that instability events occur more often when people feel marginalized because of 
extreme poverty (Miguel, 2007) and/or high youth unemployment (Azeng and Yogo, 2013; 
Urdal, 2006).21 
 
 To sum up this section, our results show that political instability was a major concern for 
small and exporting firms as well as those that were operating in the tourism sector, those that 
suffered from acts of vandalism or arson and those that were located in the interior region of 
Tunisia. 
4. The Most Damaging Constraint to Firm Growth  
This section examines which business environment constraint was the most damaging to firm 
growth in Tunisia during the post-revolutionary period. 
4.1 Main Results 
 In this paper, we define an obstacle to be damaging if it has a statistically significant and 
negative impact on firm growth which we define as the real growth in firm sales between 2009 
and 2012. We start by determining which out of the seventeen business environment obstacles, 
reported in Table A.3, are damaging using a general-to-specific modelling strategy. In particular, 
                                                          
19 In the ACLED database, data about the number political instability events (protests, attacks against civilians, 
remote violence, non-violent activity and battle won by defender) were reported at the governorate level (there 
are 24 governorates in Tunisia), while data in the WEBS were stratified into five regions. To merge the two 
datasets, we refereed to the “Tunisia 2013 Enterprise Surveys Data Set Implementation Report” that describes 
the governorates included in each of the five regions.  
20 “According to the Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa (CPG), phosphate production was only 2.5 million 
tons in 2011, compared to 8 million in 2010. The amount of phosphate fell to under 3 million”(African 
Development Bank, 2012, p. 5). In addition, firms operating in Gafsa may have another reason for considering 
political instability as an obstacle to their functioning as the city experienced a major revolt in 2008 (against 
unfair hiring practices by the state-run Gafsa Phosphate Company) that turned sometimes into riots and was 
then brutally repressed by Ben Ali’s regime (Beinin, 2016). 
21 Young and unemployed people are also used by political parties to cause trouble in return for money. In the 
case of Bengladesh, Shonchoy and Tsubota (2016, p. 6) states that “political parties hire people, mostly those 
who are relatively young, poor, unemployed and want to make quick money. These paid supporters occupy the 
major streets of the city and terrorize ordinary citizens and businesses with blockades, violence, and other 
forms of intimidation”. 
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we regress sales growth on all the different obstacles while controlling for various firm 
characteristics, and then eliminate the constraint with the highest positive (or lowest negative) 
t-ratio, one at a time, until we end up with only negative and statistically significant coefficients. 
Econometrically speaking, our OLS regression is:  
 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜽
′[𝑷𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒔] + 𝜹′[𝑭𝑪] + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
   
where [𝑷𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒔] is a vector that includes the seventeen potential constraints; 
[𝑭𝑪] is a vector of controls containing various firm characteristics that have been extensively 
used in the literature to examine the determinants of firm performance:22 firm age (and age 
squared), the export activity of the firm, its legal status, whether it is foreign owned, the 
percentage of the firm owned by the government, and the manager’s years of experience, his/her 
education level and gender. Consequently, a constraint 𝑐 = 1, … ,17 is damaging to firm growth 
if its corresponding coefficient 𝜃𝑐 is negative and statistically significant. Table 2 (below) reports 
the estimation results of equation (2). Due to space constraints, we do not report all the stages of 
the general-to-specific strategy.23 Column 1 shows that when we regress sales growth rate on all 
the obstacles, access to finance, political instability and tax administration yield significantly 
negative coefficients. However, column 3 shows that, after adopting the general-to-specific 
strategy, only the coefficients on access to finance and political instability remain negative and 
statistically significant, implying that these two constraints are damaging to firm growth.24 
Subsequently, the most damaging obstacle would be the one that has the largest coefficient in 
absolute value. When normalizing the results, we find that a one standard deviation increase in 
the access to finance and political instability constraints is associated with a 2.6 and 3.2 percent 
decrease in sales growth, respectively; suggesting that the latter is the most damaging obstacles 
to firms.25 
 
 However, our OLS results might suffer from two possible sources of biases: measurement 
error and reverse causality. As explained in section 2, the political instability constraint may be 
measured with error as firm managers may not consider all the dimensions of political instability 
when answering the surveyor’s question. Moreover, a reverse causality bias may exist as low 
performing firms tend to report more stringent constraints whereas successful firms have the 
necessary resources to overcome certain obstacles and improve the business environment 
(Dethier et al., 2011). To overcome these endogeneity issues and taking into account the data 
                                                          
22 See for example, Aterido et al. (2011), Beltrán (2016), Krauss (2015) and Pfeifer (2015). 
23 All the regression details of the general-to-specific strategy are available in Table A.5 in the appendix. Notice 
that the coefficient for the customs and trade regulations obstacle falls out after the first regression because it 
had the highest t-ratio.  
24 As shown in column (4) of Table A.5, the coefficient on tax administration becomes statistically insignificant 
after omitting tax rates. This is likely due to a multicollinearity problem as the correlation between these two 
variables was 0.75 
25 The effect of a one standard deviation increase in each constraint on sales growth is calculated by dividing 
the estimated coefficient with the corresponding deviation around that number as reported in Table 2. For 
instance, the -3.2 effect of a one standard deviation increase in political instability is calculated as -4.72/1.47.  
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limitations (e.g. the cross-sectional nature of the TES) which do not allow us to control for firm-
fixed effects and deal with any potential survivor bias, we employ an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation strategy. 
 
 Despite the richness of the TES, finding reliable instruments is challenging. As a solution, we 
employ region-sector-size averages as benchmark firm-specific instruments. This approach, 
which has been introduced by Friedman (1957) and reviewed by Angrist and Krueger (2001), is 
a widely recognized practice in the literature (Amissah and Stack, 2016; Ayyagari et al., 2008; 
Beltrán, 2016; De Rosa et al., 2010; De Waldemar, 2012; Desai and Olofsgård, 2011; Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007) to address endogeneity problems when using perception based measures as 
explanatory variables. In taking grouped averages, it is unlikely that a firm’s individual 
performance affects the perception of other companies within the same group (region-sector-
size), implying that the “direction of causality is likely to run from the average obstacles to 
individual firms, not vice versa” (Ayyagari et al., 2008, p. 499); satisfying the exclusion restriction 
assumption. At the same time, it is likely that firms operating in the same environment (region-
sector-size) have similar perceptions towards certain business obstacles. Hence, we expect our 
constructed instruments to be significantly correlated with individual firm perceptions; satisfying 
the strong instrument assumption. Moreover, taking group averages helps minimize potential 
measurement errors which are generally firm specific, thus uncorrelated with the average 
constraint values (Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Fisman and Svensson, 2007). 
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Table 2: Impact of Obstacles on Sales Growth 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The dependent variable is the real firm sales growth rate between 2009 and 2012. In all regressions, the set of firm 
characteristics includes: the firm age (and age squared), its export activity, its legal status, whether it is foreign 
owned, the percentage of the firm owned by the government, and the manager’s years of experience, his/her 
education level and gender. The endogenous variables are the political instability and access to finance constraints. 
In column 4 the region-sector-size average of each endogenous variable is used as a respective instrument. In column 
5 we add the following two instruments: (i) the firm losses as a percentage of annual sales resulting from crime 
events (vandalism, arson, etc.) and (ii) the region-sector-size average of the access to finance objective measure. 
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)   
Acc Fina -4.449*** -3.571*** -3.586*** -6.564** -6.493** 
(1.350)   (1.339)   (1.273)   (2.744)   (3.204)   
Acc Land -1.967   -1.350                           
(2.018)   (2.039)                           
Licen and Perm -1.296                                   
(2.484)                                   
Corrup 1.454                                   
(1.507)                                   
Courts 0.266   1.435                           
(2.539)   (2.518)                           
Crime 0.443                                   
(2.206)                                   
Cust and Trd Reg 5.901***                                 
(1.896)                                   
Inadeq Workfor -0.682   1.037                           
(1.381)   (1.296)                           
Labor Regul 3.584*                                  
(2.173)                                   
Pol Inst -6.177*** -4.725*** -4.317*** -10.935*** -10.920***
(1.658)   (1.477)   (1.387)   (2.961)   (3.366)   
Reg Policy Uncert -3.059*  -0.423                           
(1.822)   (1.656)                           
Informal Compet 0.693                                   
(1.239)                                   
Tax Admin -4.362*  -0.350                           
(2.288)   (1.510)                           
Tax Rates 4.561**                                 
(2.293)                                   
Elec -1.050   2.024                           
(1.678)   (1.498)                           
Telecom 3.470                                   
(2.583)                                   
Transp 2.233                                   
(2.020)                                   
Additional Controls   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Observations   518     520     520     520     498   
F-test (Access to Finance regression)                          88.4    41.9   
F-test (Political Instability regression)                          75.6    31.0   
Overidentifcation test (p-value) 0.77
  OLS      IV   
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 The results for the IV regression are reported in column 4 of Table 2. The F-statistics for 
both first-stage regressions are higher than 10 (the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb below 
which instruments are considered to be weak), suggesting that both instruments are strong. 
Moreover, the first-stage regressions, reported in panel A of Table A.6, show positive and highly 
significant relationships between each instrument and its respective endogenous variable. Most 
importantly, the coefficient on political instability remains statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level while that on access to finance loses some significance. In addition, the magnitude of the 
former becomes much larger than the latter reinforcing our main finding that political instability 
was the most damaging constraint to firm growth in Tunisia after the Arab Spring. 
 
 Notice that compared to the OLS results (column 3), the magnitudes of the coefficients 
corresponding to the financing and political instability obstacles have increased with the IV. 
(column 4). While the increase is relatively small for the former constraint, the large difference 
in magnitude between the OLS and IV coefficients on political instability is not surprising as this 
variable is measured with error, therefore leading to an attenuation bias in the OLS results. 
  
 To test the exogeneity of the instruments using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, 
we add one potential instrument for each endogenous variable. The additional instruments are 
objective measures, thereby reducing further any measurement error (Aterido et al., 2011; 
Krauss, 2015). For the political instability constraint, we use firm losses as a percentage of the 
2012 annual sales stemming from crime events (vandalism, arson, theft, etc.).26 As shown in Table 
2, this measure is significantly positively correlated with the political instability constraint; hence 
satisfying the strong instrument assumption. Moreover, crime events are likely to be exogenous 
with respect to firm characteristics, as these incidents are often associated with mass protests and 
riots that happen at the regional and national levels without necessarily targeting firms 
specifically (Roberts, 2012; Roman, 2013; Tadjoeddin, 2013).27 Therefore, we argue that this 
instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction assumption.  
                                                          
26 An ideal instrument for the subjective political instability measure would have been the actual number of 
protests and strikes that happened in Tunisia after the revolution at a spatial level. As mentioned in section 
3.5, we tried to use the number of protests, strikes and riots from the ACLED database; however, the two 
datasets could only be merged at the regional level which boils down to 5 regions (hence 5 observations), 
preventing us from exploiting spatial variation. Moreover, the variable (a3x) which represents the “Name of 
city/town/village” was missing from the TES database. We contacted the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
team to explore whether we can have access to this data but their response was the following: “Due to our 
protocols to ensure respondent confidentiality, the values for a3x are not published as it would make several respondent 
firms directly identifiable in the data”. As a simple exercise, the correlation between the subjective political 
instability measure (from the TES) and the actual number of political instability events (from the ACLED 
database) for the 5 matched regions was positive (0.3) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
suggesting that the relationship between these two variables is relatively strong.   
27 In the Tunisian case, anecdotal evidence suggests that acts of vandalism did not target specific firms; 
rather they happened during protests against high unemployment rates and poverty levels. For example, the 
following articles document some acts of vandalism during mass protests that occurred in the aftermath of 
the 2011 revolution: (i) http://news.yahoo.com/tunisia-announces-nationwide-curfew-protests-
000037792.html and (ii) http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/01/13/260237.html and (iii) 
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 The additional possible instrument for access to finance is the region-sector-size average of 
the reason why a firm did not apply for commercial bank loan.28 Table SA.1 in the supplemental 
appendix demonstrates that this objective measure is significantly positively correlated with the 
financing constraint reported by firm managers, implying that companies which did not need to 
apply for a loan because they had sufficient internal resources did not consider access to finance 
as an impediment to their functioning; hence satisfying the strong instrument assumption. 
Moreover, and as argued above, taking the region-sector-size average helps minimize 
endogeneity issues as individual characteristics of firms are not directly impacted by obstacles 
aggregated at the group level. 
 
  While one of the two additional instruments do not enter significantly in the first-stage 
regressions presented in columns panel B of Table A.6, the coefficients on both variables are 
positive and in line with our expectations. The F-statistic, governing the joint significance off 
the instruments (presented at the bottom of column 5 in Table 2) remains well above 10, therefore 
justifying the inclusion of the new instruments. In addition, the Cragg-Donald minimum 
eigenvalue statistic also suggests that the null of weak correlation between the instruments and 
the endogenous variables is rejected since the calculated value (19.2) is greater than the tabulated 
critical values (16.9 at the 10 percent level). More importantly, the overidentifying restrictions 
test indicates that the null of instruments’ endogeneity cannot be rejected as the p-value was 
0.77. Overall, the results, based on this larger pool of instruments, corroborate our main finding 
that political instability was the most damaging constraint to firm growth in Tunisia after the 
Arab Spring. 
4.2 Robustness Analysis 
In what follows, we perform two robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results. First, 
we explore whether our baseline results are sensitive to using employment growth as a measure 
of firm performance29 by replicating the same regressions as equation (2), this time considering 
employment growth between 2009 and 2012 as the dependent variable.30 The results of this test 
are reported in Table A.7. Following the general-to-specific strategy we find, as indicated in 
columns 1, 2 and 3, that the damaging constraints to employment growth are political instability 
and an inadequately educated workforce. The latter, however, is only significant at the 10 percent 
level and its coefficient is half of the former. This result, which suggests that political instability 
is also the most damaging constraint to employment growth, is confirmed when taking care of 
                                                          
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21567991-economic-neglect-menacing-fragile-
new-democracy-democracy-and-riots.  
28 The definition of the objective measure corresponding to the access to finance obstacle is available in Table 
A.4 in the appendix. 
29 Dollar et al. (2005), Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006), Aterido et al. (2011), Trentini and Koparanova (2013) 
and Stel and Naudé (2016) have all considered employment growth as an alternative/complementary measure 
of firm performance.  
30 Our measure of employment at year 2009 and 2012 is the number of full-time employees at the end of the 
year. 
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endogeneity using region-sector-size averages and firm losses as a percentage of the 2012 annual 
sales stemming from crime events as firm specific instruments. In both IV specifications (columns 
4 and 5), the coefficient on the inadequately educated force becomes insignificant while that on 
political instability remains strongly significant and its magnitude increases. Most importantly, 
these results indicate that, irrespective of how firm growth is measured, political instability was 
the most damaging constraint to firm performance.  
 
 Second, and while the main results (section 4.1) determine which constraint was the most 
damaging to Tunisian firms, they do not inform us whether firms reacted differently to different 
business constraint levels. To tackle this question, we re-estimate the regressions presented in 
columns 3 and 5 of Table 2 while focusing on disaggregating each damaging constraint (access 
to finance and political instability) into three separate dummy variables: no obstacle (equals 1 if 
firm 𝑖 did not consider issue X as a constraint), small obstacle (equals 1 if firm 𝑖 considers issue 
X a minor constraint) and big obstacle (equals 1 if firm 𝑖 considers issue X as moderate, major or 
very severe constraint).31 The results reported in Table A.8 suggest that Tunisian firms can cope 
with low levels of political instability and financing constraints. What is noticeable, however, is 
that higher levels of political instability amplified the adverse impact on firm growth.32 To 
compare the appropriateness between the aggregated model (Table 2) and the one with grouped 
dummies (Table A.8), the J and Cox-Pesaran statistics are used.33 Considering the financing 
constraints, both statistics indicate that the two models should not be rejected as their p-values 
are higher than 10 percent. On the other hand, when focusing on political instability, the model 
with disaggregated levels seems to be the preferred one.34 Consequently, we conclude that the 
disaggregated level is more useful in explaining how firm growth is impacted by political 
instability.  
 
 In sum, our two robustness tests confirm that political instability was the most damaging 
constraint to Tunisian firms after the Arab Spring. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper has examined the previously unexplored implications of political instability on firm 
growth in the context of Tunisia after the Arab Spring. Using firm-level data drawn from the 
TES, we initially investigated which firms perceived political instability as an impediment to 
their operations and then analyzed which business constraint was the most damaging to firm 
growth.  
                                                          
31 The No Obstacle category was omitted. 
32 Unfortunately, the survey does not provide details about the different dimensions of political instability, 
which prevents us from determining which dimension (e.g. political violence, armed conflicts, civil protests, 
instability of the political regime, etc.) is the most damaging to Tunisian firms.  
33 The J and Cox-Pesaran statistics are usually used to compare the appropriateness between two non-nested 
models. 
34 For the political instability constraint, the p-values of the J and Cox-Pesaran were, respectively, 0.06 and 
0.02 (0.54 and 0.27) for the aggregated (disaggregated) model.   
17 
 
 
 We have presented evidence that political instability was a major concern for small and 
exporting firms as well as those that were operating in the tourism sector, those that suffered 
from acts of vandalism or arson and those that were located in the interior region of Tunisia. 
Most importantly, we have found that political instability was the most damaging constraint to 
firm growth in Tunisia after the Arab Spring. There are several potential channels by which 
political instability could have affected Tunisian firms. One possibility is that the protracted 
period of transition from an autocratic to a democratic regime has increased the uncertainty about 
the future political and economic agendas and therefore induced companies to postpone their 
investment decisions. This is quite possible as the Investment Profile Index dropped from 8.5 on 
the eve of the revolution to 6 in 2013, hence indicating that the risk associated with investing in 
Tunisia increased significantly following the revolution.35 A second potential channel is the 
marked increase in protests and strikes since the onset of the Jasmine revolution which has (i) 
reduced firm productivity as such incidents tend to disrupt the production process due to 
workers’ absenteeism (Krueger and Mas, 2004; Mas, 2008) and (ii) increased the cost of 
production (Shonchoy and Tsubota, 2016). A third related channel is that nationwide mass civil 
protest usually create distractions to both workers and managers, thus diverting the attention 
away from their regular job duties (Ashraf et al., 2015). 
 
 Our findings have some policy implications. Traditionally, the challenge of firm growth is 
tackled through a technical and apolitical lens. However, our analysis provides evidence that, 
when it comes to revolution-torn countries, policy makers should first and foremost shield the 
economy against destabilizing political and security incidents. Specifically, Tunisian 
policymakers should focus on reducing political instability in regions that were the most affected 
by it (e.g. the interior region in our case) through tackling its root causes such as high 
unemployment rates, regional disparities and income inequalities which are argued to be the main 
reasons behind the uprisings in the interior region. According to El-Khawas (2012, p. 7), 
“unemployment was more than 22 percent in Kasserine and Gafsa in the interior, regions that 
were among the first to challenge the regime”.36 In addition, the Tunisian authorities are 
encouraged to develop policies aimed at targeting small and exporting firms as well as those that 
are operating in the tourism sector as these firms are found to be the most affected during periods 
of high political instability. However, the implementation of such policies should be carefully 
designed and coupled by clear and institutionalized checks and balances that would prevent the 
recurrence of practices of crony capitalism such as the interventionist industrial and economic 
policies that mainly benefitted firms close to the Ben Ali regime before the revolution occured 
(Rijkers et al., 2014). 
 
                                                          
35 The Investment Profile Index is a measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment. A score of 12 
indicates a very low risk, while a score of 0 suggests a very high risk. 
36 “Regional disparities were very large: (i) average poverty rates remained 3 times as high in the interior of 
the country than in richer coastal “offshore” areas; (ii) at 25 percent, unemployment rates in the interior regions 
were double those of coastal areas; and (iii) only 13 percent of foreign firms were created in the interior regions.” 
(IMF, 2015, p. 22). 
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 Unfortunately, this study suffered from two main data limitations. First, in terms of quality, 
we only have a multidimensional measure of political instability, which prevents us from testing 
whether the relationship between political turmoil and firm growth varies across different 
dimensions of instability (e.g. political violence, armed conflicts, civil protests, instability of the 
political regime, etc.). Second, in terms of quantity, we do not have firm-level data prior to the 
revolution. This has prevented us from using panel-econometric techniques which would have 
enabled us to account for firm fixed effects and potential survivor biases. 
 
  Finally, and while this study was focused on Tunisia, its findings may be relevant to other 
countries that experienced a long and protracted period of transition from one political regime 
to another. However, due to the geo-political, cultural and historical specificities of the Arab 
world, we recognize that political instability in the MENA region is a complex issue which needs 
more research to understand its causes, dynamics and economic implications, particularly 
following the recent uprisings. 
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Appendix 
Figure A.1: Frequency Distribution of Business Obstacles 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the TES data. Notes: The question used to gauge the perception of a firm 
manager towards a certain constraint is: “To what degree is constraint X an obstacle to the current operations of 
this establishment?”. The answers to that question include a five-point scale ranging from “No Obstacle” coded as 
0, to “Very Severe Obstacle” coded as 4. In each graph the number of observations is 569. 
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Figure A.2: Number of Political Instability Events by Region Between 2011 and 2014 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the ACLED database. 
  
25 
 
Table A.1: List of firm characteristics and the corresponding coding 
 
Source: TES database and author’s own coding. 
 
 
Table A.2: Summary statistics of firm characteristics 
 
Source: TES database and author’s own coding. 
 
Variable Category Code
Firm Size Small: 5 to 19 employees 1
Medium: 20 to 99 employees 2
Large: more than 100 employees 3
Firm Age Number of years in operation since firm creation Continious variable
Export Activity Less than 10 percent of sales are direct exports 0
More than 10 percent of sales are direct exports 1
Foreign Owned Less than 50 percent of the company is owned by a foreign entity 0
At least 50 percent of the company is owned by a foreign entity 1
Manager's Experience Manager's years of eperience Continious variable
Manager's Gender Female 1
Male 2
Manager's Education Level Completed Primary school 1
Preparatory or Incomplete Secondary school 2
Completed Secondary school including Vocational 3
University degree or higher 4
Subsidy This establishment did not receive any subsidies 0
This establishment received any subsidies 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Size 569 1.87 0.76 1 3
Manag Exp 561 25.75 11.41 1 63
Manag Gend 569 1.93 0.26 1 2
Subsidy 566 0.16 0.37 0 1
Foreign 569 0.10 0.30 0 1
Age 567 22.81 14.12 1 108
Manag Educ 567 3.67 0.58 1 4
Exporter 569 0.39 0.49 0 1
Sales Growth 535 0.26 38.49 -66 164
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Table A.3: Business Environment Obstacles Averaged Across Firm Characteristic 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the TES data. Notes: aA firm is considered Small if it employs 5 to 19 employees, Medium if it employs 20 to 99 employees 
and Large if it employs at least 100 employees. bA firm is considered Very Young if it has been established 0 to 5 years prior to 2013, Young if it has been established 
6 to 20 years prior to 2013, Old if it has been established 21 to 35 years prior to 2013 and Very Old if it has been established more than 36 years prior to 2013. cA 
firm is considered a Non-Exporter if it exports less than 10 percent of its sales and an Exporter if it exports more than 10 percent of its sales. dA firm manager is 
classified as having Little experience if he has 0 to 5 years of work experience, Medium experience if he/she has 6 to 20 years of work experience, High experience 
if he/she has 21 to 35 years of work experience and A lot of experience if he/she has more than 36 years of work experience. 
 
  
Acc Fina   1.12   1.38   1.04   0.85   1.72   1.11   1.09   1.00   1.08   1.18   1.31   1.24   1.10   0.98
Acc Land   0.41   0.48   0.37   0.40   0.59   0.47   0.31   0.40   0.35   0.52   0.56   0.48   0.40   0.33
Licen and Perm   0.38   0.36   0.40   0.40   0.72   0.31   0.42   0.35   0.41   0.35   0.50   0.36   0.38   0.42
Corrup   1.80   1.92   1.80   1.62   1.72   1.84   1.88   1.50   1.77   1.86   2.50   1.93   1.81   1.49
Courts   0.38   0.41   0.38   0.33   0.53   0.43   0.26   0.41   0.41   0.34   0.75   0.44   0.34   0.34
Crime   0.57   0.64   0.56   0.48   0.66   0.54   0.56   0.66   0.54   0.62   0.81   0.55   0.52   0.70
Cust and Trd Reg   0.58   0.53   0.65   0.54   1.13   0.57   0.64   0.38   0.53   0.67   0.63   0.72   0.58   0.35
Inadeq Workfor   1.61   1.50   1.65   1.72   1.50   1.62   1.67   1.57   1.60   1.62   2.06   1.69   1.73   1.19
Labor Regul   0.57   0.49   0.65   0.53   0.69   0.57   0.51   0.63   0.53   0.62   1.06   0.49   0.61   0.52
Pol Inst   2.44   2.66   2.34   2.25   2.34   2.50   2.47   2.21   2.41   2.48   2.75   2.63   2.36   2.22
Reg Policy Uncert   0.95   0.95   1.06   0.75   1.06   0.96   0.87   1.00   0.90   1.02   1.00 0.93   0.93   1.00
Informal Compet   1.28   1.52   1.32   0.80   0.94   1.18   1.30   1.57   1.41   1.08   0.69   1.23   1.27   1.45
Tax Admin   1.00   1.09   0.99   0.87   1.16   0.95   1.03   1.08   1.03   0.96   0.69   1.02   0.98   1.09
Tax Rates   1.11   1.16   1.13   1.00   1.26   1.09   1.07   1.26   1.15   1.05   1.27   1.16   1.05   1.15
Elec   0.54   0.54   0.52   0.57   0.78   0.50   0.57   0.51   0.44   0.69   0.69   0.63   0.49   0.48
Telecom   0.41   0.43   0.37   0.43   0.56   0.40   0.46   0.33   0.36   0.48   0.69   0.48   0.33   0.38
Transp   0.54   0.57   0.51   0.54   0.66   0.51   0.58   0.54   0.53   0.54   0.88   0.58   0.51   0.49
Observations    569    205    235    129     32    255    171     92    346    223     16    196    233    116
 Large
Total 
Sample
Very 
Young
 Young    Old  A lot
 Size
a
   Age
b
Exporting Activity
c
Manager's Experience
d
Very Old
Non-
Exporter
Exporter Little Medium   High Small Medium
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Table A.3: (Continued) Business Environment Obstacles Averaged Across Firm Characteristic 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the TES data. 
Acc Fina   1.67   1.08   1.40   1.22   1.07   1.13   0.91   1.12   1.23   1.02   1.73   1.07   1.25   1.17
Acc Land   0.45   0.41   0.00   0.78   0.37   0.42   0.30   0.34   0.46   0.46   0.63   0.49   0.28   0.33
Licen and Perm   0.52   0.37   0.80   0.39   0.36   0.38   0.37   0.60   0.32   0.29   0.35   0.38   0.44   0.37
Corrup   2.14   1.78   2.40   1.67   1.76   1.81   1.66   1.82   1.77   1.84   2.15   1.69   2.28   1.83
Courts   0.38   0.38   0.20   0.56   0.33   0.39   0.51   0.32   0.36   0.30   0.53   0.38   0.52   0.34
Crime   0.93   0.54   1.40   0.50   0.52   0.58   0.46   0.55   0.56   0.54   1.13   0.54   0.74   0.57
Cust and Trd Reg   0.69   0.57   0.60   0.22   0.45   0.64   0.85   0.55   0.74   0.24   0.50   0.54   0.62   0.63
Inadeq Workfor   1.93   1.59   2.20   1.33   1.43   1.68   1.45   1.31   1.71   1.76   2.08   1.69   1.66   1.47
Labor Regul   0.74   0.55   0.20   0.83   0.44   0.60   0.48   0.75   0.58   0.41   0.72   0.61   0.62   0.47
Pol Inst   2.69   2.42   2.00   2.22   2.46   2.45   2.31   2.31   2.48   2.45   3.00   2.28   2.59   2.65
Reg Policy Uncert   0.98   0.95   1.40   1.17   0.90   0.95   0.82   1.47   0.80   0.71   1.18   0.97   1.05   0.88
Informal Compet   1.33   1.27   2.00   1.28   1.58   1.17   1.08   1.66   1.24   1.20   1.13   1.21   1.70   1.26
Tax Admin   1.38   0.97   1.60   0.72   1.04   0.99   0.94   1.07   1.01   0.91   1.23   0.92   1.23   1.06
Tax Rates   1.39   1.09   1.60   0.44   1.29   1.08   1.05   1.20   1.10   1.04   1.33   1.01   1.23   1.24
Elec   0.81   0.52   1.00   0.72   0.34   0.59   0.50   0.29   0.80   0.49   0.63   0.61   0.44   0.44
Telecom   0.83   0.37   1.20   0.06   0.22   0.47   0.39   0.36   0.60   0.26   0.40   0.43   0.41   0.37
Transp   0.90   0.51   1.20   0.50   0.43   0.56   0.52   0.54   0.60   0.41   0.78   0.53   0.46   0.56
Observations     42    527      5     18    134    410    119    121    149    140     40    318     61    190
Prep 
School
Second 
School
Univ or 
Higher
Retail Services
Sector
 Tunis   Sfax Northeast
South 
Coast/
West
Interior  Manuf
Manager's Gender Manager's Education Region
Female   Male
Prim 
School
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Table A.4: Definition of the Objective Variables Corresponding to the Subjective Measures 
 
Source: TES database. 
 
 
 
  
Subjective Measure Objective Variable
Access to Finance Why the firm did not apply for a loan? (1: no need for a loan / 2: financing constraints)
Access to Land Percentage of Land not owned by firm (%)
Corruption Informal payment to public officials (% of sales)
Crime Losses as a result of crime in 2012 (% of sales)
Number of days to obtain an import license
Did this establishment have formal training programs for his employees in 2012? (yes/no)
Does this establishment compete against unregistered or informal firms? (yes/no)
Electricity Number of power outages in a typical month
Telecommunications Does the firm use of cell phones? (yes/no)
In a typical month, over fiscal year 2012, how many power outages 
did this establishment experience?
Does this establishment currently use cell phones for the 
operations of the establishment?
Definition of the Objective Measure
Referring again to the last fiscal year 2012, what was the main 
reason why this establishment did not apply for any line of credit 
or loan? (i) No need for a loan -establishment had sufficient capital; 
(ii) Application procedures were complex; (iii) Interest rates were 
not favorable; (iv) Collateral requirements were too high; (v) Size 
of loan and maturity were insufficient; Did not think it would be 
approved or (vi) other.
Of the land occupied by this establishment, what percent is not 
owned by this establishment (i.e. Rented, leased or other)
On average, what percentage of total annual sales, or estimated 
total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal 
payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?
In fiscal year 2012, what were the estimated losses as a result of 
theft, robbery, vandalism or arson that occurred on this 
establishment’s premises either as a percentage of total annual 
sales losses?
Approximately how many days did it take to obtain this import 
license from the day of the application to the day it was granted?
Over fiscal year 2012, did this establishment have formal training 
programs for its permanent, full-time employees?
Customs and Trade 
Regulation
Inadequately Educated 
Workforce
Practices of Competitors 
in the Informal Sector
Does this establishment compete against unregistered or informal 
firms?
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Table A.5: General-to-Specific OLS regressions 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The dependent variable is the real firm 
sales growth rate between 2009 and 2012. In all regressions, the set of firm characteristics includes: the firm age (and age squared), its export activity, its legal 
status, whether its foreign owned, the percentage of the firm owned by the government, and the manager’s years of experience, his/her education level and 
gender.
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)    (10)    (11)    (12)    (13)    (14)   
Acc Fina -4.449*** -4.441*** -4.386*** -4.058*** -3.701*** -3.642*** -3.549*** -3.485*** -3.467*** -3.416** -3.415** -3.422*** -3.475*** -3.586***
(1.350)   (1.360)   (1.374)   (1.378)   (1.335)   (1.333)   (1.330)   (1.312)   (1.310)   (1.321)   (1.321)   (1.323)   (1.288)   (1.273)   
Acc Land -1.967   -1.817   -1.783   -1.410   -1.360   -1.055   -1.135   -1.174   -1.005   -0.807   -0.785   -0.798   -0.820           
(2.018)   (2.023)   (2.017)   (2.014)   (2.045)   (2.032)   (2.051)   (2.055)   (2.034)   (2.014)   (2.016)   (2.009)   (2.007)           
Licen and Perm -1.296   -0.720   -0.655   -0.769   0.086   0.319   0.323   0.340   0.425   0.899                                   
(2.484)   (2.541)   (2.556)   (2.462)   (2.437)   (2.481)   (2.475)   (2.468)   (2.450)   (2.514)                                   
Corrup 1.454   2.159   2.418   2.406   2.342   2.276                                                                   
(1.507)   (1.490)   (1.504)   (1.516)   (1.512)   (1.516)                                                                   
Courts 0.266   0.575   0.508   0.419   1.138   1.506   1.595   1.625                                                   
(2.539)   (2.585)   (2.563)   (2.548)   (2.580)   (2.530)   (2.526)   (2.519)                                                   
Crime 0.443   0.057   0.249   0.312   0.674   0.980   1.124   1.239   1.391                                           
(2.206)   (2.259)   (2.234)   (2.217)   (2.232)   (2.231)   (2.231)   (2.172)   (2.142)                                           
Cust and Trd Reg 5.901***                                                                                                         
(1.896)                                                                                                           
Inadeq Workfor -0.682   -0.399   -0.360   -0.246   0.101   0.107   0.866                                                           
(1.381)   (1.348)   (1.342)   (1.341)   (1.388)   (1.386)   (1.355)                                                           
Labor Regul 3.584*  3.633   4.118*  4.184*                                                                                  
(2.173)   (2.251)   (2.213)   (2.210)                                                                                   
Pol Inst -6.177*** -6.635*** -6.582*** -6.107*** -6.048*** -5.865*** -4.686*** -4.508*** -4.473*** -4.295*** -4.248*** -4.261*** -4.297*** -4.317***
(1.658)   (1.657)   (1.653)   (1.628)   (1.653)   (1.655)   (1.506)   (1.495)   (1.499)   (1.459)   (1.444)   (1.416)   (1.390)   (1.387)   
Reg Policy Uncert -3.059*  -2.553   -2.474   -2.116   -1.116   -1.070   -0.790   -0.956   -0.625   -0.251   -0.093                           
(1.822)   (1.835)   (1.826)   (1.793)   (1.744)   (1.754)   (1.768)   (1.719)   (1.649)   (1.588)   (1.542)                           
Informal Compet 0.693   1.113   0.905   0.930   0.815   0.708   0.757   0.787   0.821                                           
(1.239)   (1.235)   (1.232)   (1.243)   (1.214)   (1.223)   (1.222)   (1.216)   (1.217)                                           
Tax Admin -4.362*  -4.478*  -4.698** -1.084   -0.766   -0.937   -0.707   -0.637   -0.598   -0.428   -0.292   -0.307                   
(2.288)   (2.315)   (2.288)   (1.644)   (1.633)   (1.641)   (1.620)   (1.634)   (1.634)   (1.594)   (1.516)   (1.506)                   
Tax Rates 4.561** 4.766** 5.062**                                                                                         
(2.293)   (2.297)   (2.270)                                                                                           
Elec -1.050   -0.484   0.149   0.277   2.074                                                                           
(1.678)   (1.686)   (1.711)   (1.729)   (1.473)                                                                           
Telecom 3.470   3.804   4.468*  4.039                                                                                   
(2.583)   (2.659)   (2.509)   (2.548)                                                                                   
Transp 2.233   3.429                                                                                                   
(2.020)   (2.096)                                                                                                   
Additional Controls   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Observations   518     518     518     519     519     519     519     519     519     520     520     520     520     520   
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Table A.6: First-Stage IV Results 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
In each regression, the dependent variable is presented below the column number. In all regressions, the set of firm 
characteristics includes: the firm age (and age squared), its export activity, its legal status, whether it is foreign 
owned, the percentage of the firm owned by the government, and the manager’s years of experience, his/her 
education level and gender.  In panel A (B), we consider the first stage regressions of column 4 (5) of Table 2. 
.  
  
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)   
Access to Finance (Average) 0.968***         0.963***         
(0.079)           (0.104)           
Political Instability (Average)         1.014***         1.001***
        (0.076)           (0.077)   
Access to Finance Objective Measure (Average)                 0.054           
                (0.214)           
Losses as a result of crime in 2012 (% of sales)                         0.040***
                        (0.010)   
Additional Controls   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Observations   520     520     499     519   
Panel A   Panel B   
Access to 
Finance   
Political 
Instability   
Access to 
Finance   
Political 
Instability   
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Table A.7: Impact of Obstacles on Employment Growth 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of full-time employees between 2009 and 2012. In all regressions, the set 
of firm characteristics includes: the firm age (and age squared), its export activity, its legal status, whether it is 
foreign owned, the percentage of the firm owned by the government, and the manager’s years of experience, his/her 
education level and gender. The endogenous variables are the political instability and the inadequately educated 
workforce. In column 4, the region-sector-size average of each endogenous variable is used as a respective 
instrument. In column 5, we add the percentage of annual sales resulting from crime events (vandalism, arson, etc.) 
as an instrument. 
  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)   
Acc Fina 0.250                                   
(1.296)                                   
Acc Land 0.123                                   
(2.216)                                   
Licen and Perm 0.320   -0.125                           
(2.327)   (2.343)                           
Corrup 1.381                                   
(1.701)                                   
Courts -0.214   0.316                           
(2.332)   (2.240)                           
Crime -0.179   -0.580                           
(1.680)   (1.693)                           
Cust and Trd Reg 1.656                                   
(1.526)                                   
Inadeq Workfor -2.917** -2.104*  -2.129*  0.891   0.787   
(1.420)   (1.267)   (1.225)   (2.697)   (2.666)   
Labor Regul -0.793   -0.480                           
(2.042)   (2.012)                           
Pol Inst -5.805*** -4.591*** -4.530*** -10.067*** -9.915***
(1.744)   (1.424)   (1.322)   (2.601)   (2.600)   
Reg Policy Uncert -0.416   -0.017                           
(1.815)   (1.801)                           
Informal Compet -0.415   0.111                           
(1.175)   (1.198)                           
Tax Admin -1.614   -0.127                           
(1.820)   (1.384)                           
Tax Rates 1.610                                   
(1.816)                                   
Elec -1.432   0.721                           
(1.817)   (1.915)                           
Telecom 3.229*                                  
(1.875)                                   
Transp -0.379   0.509                           
(1.537)   (1.554)                           
Additional Controls   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Observations   511     513     514     514     513   
F-test (Inadequately Educated Workforce regression)                          94.9    61.5   
F-test (Political Instability regression)                          74.9    49.7   
Overidentifcation test (p-value) 0.87
  OLS      IV   
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Table A.8: Disaggregated Impact of Damaging Constraints on Sales Growth 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance levels of 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The dependent variable is the real firm sales growth 
rate between 2009 and 2012. In all regressions, the set of firm characteristics includes: 
the firm age (and age squared), its export activity, its legal status, whether it is foreign 
owned, the percentage of the firm owned by the government, and the manager’s years 
of experience, his/her education level and gender. Small obstacle equals 1 if firm 𝑖 
considers issue X a minor constraint and Big Obstacle equals 1 if firm 𝑖 considers issue 
X as moderate, major or very severe constraint. 
 
  OLS      IV   
  (1)     (2)   
Acc Fin (Small Obstacle) -7.393   -9.092   
(4.899)   (12.058)   
Acc Fin (Big Obstacle) -10.666*** -24.150***
(3.600)   (8.180)   
Pol Inst (Small Obstacle) -4.991   -14.251   
(7.100)   (17.659)   
Pol Inst (Big Obstacle) -16.858*** -34.055***
(5.168)   (11.670)   
Additional Controls   Yes     Yes   
Observations   520     519   
F-test (in Small Access to Finance)          13.1   
F-test (in Big Access to Finance)          34.3   
F-test (in Small Political Instability)          11.2   
F-test (in Big Political Instability)          29.5   
Overidentifcation test (p-value) 0.85
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This Supplemental Appendix (SA) includes three sections. The first describes the ACLED 
database referred to in the main text, while the second examines the relationship between 
subjective and objective business constraints measures mentioned in section 2 of the main text. 
Finally, the third section explores whether our dataset suffers from a survivor bias. 
SA.1. The ACLED Database 
ACLED is a conflict dataset that was recently launched by Raleigh et al. (2010) to provide 
disaggregated data about conflicts in more than 60 countries located particularly in Africa and 
Asia. In its fifth and latest version,37 the ACLED database reports different kind of conflict events, 
based on articles and reports from the humanitarian agencies, the media, and other research 
publications. It contains detailed information regarding the date and location (including detailed 
GPS coordinates such as longitude and latitude) of each conflict event. In addition, it includes 
the number of fatalities that resulted from each event as well as the parties involved in it. Most 
importantly, this database includes five different kinds of conflicts in the Tunisian case, which 
according to Raleigh and Dowd (2015) are defined as following:  
 Battle won by defender: “A battle between two violent armed groups where control of the 
contested location does not change”. 
 Non-violent activity: “This category is designed to capture events that are important 
within a state’s political history, and may be triggers of future events, but are not directly 
violent” 
 Remote violence: “Remote violence refers to events in which the tool for engaging in 
conflict did not require the physical presence of the perpetrator.” 
 Violence against civilians: “Violence against civilians occurs when any armed/violent 
group attacks civilians”. 
 Protests/Riots:  “A protest describes a non-violent, group public demonstration, often 
against a government institution. Rioting is a violent form of demonstration”. 
 
  
                                                          
37 Version 5 of the ACLED database includes conflict data from 1997 till 2014. 
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SA.2. Relationship Between Subjective and Objective Measures 
One possible drawback of our analysis is the use of subjective data (managers’ perception towards 
a certain issue as a constraint) as measures of business environment constraints. According to 
Bertrand and Mullatinathan (2001), subjective measures used typically in surveys may be affected 
by general waves of optimism or pessimism which may induce a measurement error of the true 
impact of a certain obstacle to firm growth. However, several studies found evidence of a 
significantly positive relationship between different perception based measures and their 
objective variables (Contessi and De Nicola, 2013; Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido, 2009; Pierre 
and Scarpetta, 2004). To test whether these associations hold in our data, we follow Hallward-
Driemeier and Aterido (2009) and estimate the following Ordered Probit model for each 
subjective measure for which an objective counterpart is available in the TES database:  
 
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖 .  (S.1) 
   
 In equation (S.1) 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 is the categorical variables that ranges from 0 (no 
obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle) representing firm 𝑖’s perception towards a certain issue as a 
business environment obstacle (as defined earlier), while 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 is an objective 
measure of the corresponding constraint selected based on previous research (Hallward-
Driemeier and Aterido, 2009; Krauss, 2015). Table A.4 lists the objective variables corresponding 
to each subjective measure in addition to a definition of the former. Finally, 𝛿𝑑 is an industry 
dummy variable which captures the fact that firms in different industries may be more impacted 
by certain obstacles (e.g. firms in labor intensive sectors may be more impacted by labor 
regulations than firms that rely more on capital).  
 
 As reported in Table SA.1, out of the nine perception based constraints that have a 
corresponding objective measure in the TES,38 eight have a positive and statistically significant 
β1 meaning that as the real business environment worsens, the probability that a firm perceives 
this constraint as more damaging to its growth increases.39 Therefore, the variation in the 
subjective measures of business constraints used in the TES captures, albeit not perfectly, the 
actual impact of these constraints on firms. Before proceeding, we should note that the 
insignificance of the estimated coefficient for the customs and trade regulation, may be due to the 
fact the objective variable (number of days to obtain an import license) is not a good measure of 
                                                          
38 For the following eight subjective measures of business environment constraints, the TES database did not 
have objective measures: Courts, Labor regulations, Political Instability, Regulatory Policy Uncertainty, Tax 
administration, Tax rate, Transport. Meanwhile, for Business licensing and permits, there was only 20 
enterprises that applied to obtain an operating license.   
39 Given our interest in the relationship between subjective and objective measures of business environment 
constraints, it suffices to look at the sign and significance of the 𝛽1’s without looking at the marginal effects 
which determine the reaction of the subjective measure (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖) to a one unit increase in its 
objective counterpart (𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖). 
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the trade environment given that around 20 percent of firms have reported customs and trade 
regulation as an obstacle to their functioning while not even applying to obtain an import license. 
SA.3. Potential Survivor Bias 
As mentioned in section 2 of the main text, our results might suffer from a firm survivor bias. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to address this potential survivor bias as the TES data does not 
cover the pre-revolution period.  
 
 However, aggregated level data from the Répertoire National des Entreprises (RNE) 
published by the Tunisian National Institute (TNI) can be used to shed light on the firm exit rate 
dynamics across different regions and size classifications. In particular, substantial differences in 
firm exit changes after 2011 would signal that the revolution had a substantial differential impact 
on firm exit across different categories; thereby increasing the likelihood of a possible survivor 
bias in the TES. As illustrated in Figure SA.1 and Figure SA.2, the change in firm exit rate40 
followed, since 2011, a similar path across different size classifications and regions, respectively, 
indicating that the increase in firm exit in 2011 was random and not particular to a certain group 
of firms. Therefore, we conclude that there is no (observable) evidence supporting any firm 
survivor bias.
                                                          
40 We define firm exit rate as the number of firms that exited the market in year t divided by the total number 
of firms in the market at the end of year t-1 multiplied by 100. 
 Table SA.1: Ordered Probit models of subjective measures regressed on their objective counterparts 
 
Source: Author's own calculations based on the TES database. Notes: In each individual regression, the dependent variable is a categorical variables that ranges 
from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle) representing firm i’s perception towards a certain issue as a business environment obstacle. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependant Variable 
Why the firm did not apply for a loan? (1: no need for a loan / 2: financing constraints) 1.417***                                                                 
(0.144)                                                                   
Percentage of Land not owned by firm (%)         0.002*                                                          
        (0.001)                                                           
Informal payment to public officials (% of sales)                 0.039***                                                 
                (0.006)                                                   
Losses as a result of crime in 2012 (% of sales)                         0.179***                                         
                        (0.054)                                           
Number of days to obtain an import license                                 0.007                                   
                                (0.005)                                   
Did this establishment have formal training programs for his employees in 2012?                                         0.169*                          
                                        (0.097)                           
Does this establishment compete against unregistered or informal firms? (yes/no)                                                 2.212***                 
                                                (0.129)                   
Number of power outages in a typical month                                                         0.144***         
                                                        (0.045)           
Does the firm use of cell phones? (yes/no)                                                                 0.660***
                                                                (0.221)   
Observations   321     569     397     567     134     569     565     565     569   
Sector Dummies   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes   
Practices of 
competitors in 
the informal 
sector
Electricity
Telecommuni
cations 
Access to 
finance 
Access to 
land   
Corruption   Crime   
Customs and 
trade 
regulation 
Inadequately 
educated 
workforce
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Figure SA.1: Change in firm exit rate by firm size 
Source: RNE database and author’s own calculations. 
Figure SA.2: Change in firm exit rate by region 
Source: RNE database and author’s own calculations. 
 
